Jürgen Osterhammel:: Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine  Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts by Vries, Peer
Some people may object to calling a book with over 1500 pages a monograph. They may 
have a point. But for lack of a better word I would want to claim that Die Verwandlung 
der Welt (München 2009), to my knowledge of course, is the best monograph dealing 
with the history of the world in any period of time that has as yet been published. It is 
written with an almost un-German clarity and contains a very fine mix of description, 
analysis and synthesis. It has not, as is so often the case in German scholarly works, 
been overburdened with tortuous excursions into historiography and historiographical 
debates, although no one would want to doubt that Osterhammel knows the relevant 
literature in that respect. Point is that he only refers to it when that actually makes sense. 
The core of the book consists of eighteen essay-like chapters in which the author pres-
ents an amazing amount of information in a systematic but very digestible way, almost 
like a teacher would discuss and explain his subject-matter in class, always attentive to 
divisions and subdivisions, comparisons, summaries and examples. Although at times 
this gives the book a somewhat state-of-the-art, textbook-like flavour, it never becomes 
boring, probably because, overall, the author does not shy away from presenting his own 
opinions when he sees fit or from indicating where questions are still open and further 
research would be welcome. He always does so succinctly, in clear terms, even-handedly 
and without being pedantically present. His erudition is absolutely stunning and never 
escalates into an encyclopaedic Anekdotenkrämerei. Occasionally he may have a tendency 
to indulge in German Gründlichkeit, e.g. in the chapters on space or on cities, where 
some readers may feel he could have trimmed the text somewhat down. This slight, 
occasional overkill, however, is more than compensated by the numerous illuminating, 
enlivening and often striking examples, details and anecdotes that he can come up with 
exactly because of his erudition. It is these concrete references, amongst many other 
things, that make the book a joy to read. 
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Osterhammel at the moment is probably best known for his publications on globali-
sation and colonialism. Earlier on in his career he focused on the history of Asia, in 
particular China. His China und die Weltgesellschaft, published in 1989, is a brilliant syn-
thesis that ought to have been translated in English. In the very beginning of that career, 
he published on, amongst other things, British imperialism in China. As he indicates 
himself in the book under review, he has become increasingly interested in the history of 
the United States, a history that often tends to be under-represented in books on global 
history. Although one can never be sufficiently prepared to start writing a book like this 
one, Osterhammel in any case had a first-rate and first-hand knowledge of the modern 
history of many parts of the world when he set out to do so. 
In that respect the great ease with which he switches from one branch of the discipline of 
history to another one is also striking. Whether he is discussing environmental, econom-
ic, social, political or cultural history, he does so with great knowledge and competence. 
Especially his expertise in the field of political, social and cultural history is extremely 
valuable. In global history – though, admittedly, this might apply more to studies of the 
early modern than the modern era – attention often tends to be paid to the so-called 
hard infrastructures of material life like demography, technology and the availability 
of resources at the expense of other factors. Osterhammel’s more ‘sociological’ look at 
historical processes is a very welcome complement to that rather one-sided, materialist 
approach.
In the Epilogue, Osterhammel indicates he wanted to write this book because he felt 
that in Germany the moment had arrived to practise global history instead of basically 
only discussing it. In dealing with the nineteenth century, that has become ‘his’ century, 
all history other than global history, so he claims, can only be second best. As such, that 
need not be a major problem: he does not consider the work of ‘global’ historians to 
be fundamentally different from that of ‘ordinary’ historians. Basically, they confront 
quite similar problems. To become a good global historian one, according to Osterham-
mel – apart from the general historical skills – needs a sense of proportion and orders 
of magnitude, of fields of forces and mutual influences, and a notion of what is typical 
and representative. The good global historian does not have to be omniscient. What he 
should be, however, is humble in his recognition that in the end his writing is dependent 
on the empirical studies of other scholars. That recognition implies that in his efforts to 
come up with macro-views and -arguments he should consult the best and most recent 
of those studies and distil their essence. One can only agree.
*  *  *
The book claims to be a global history of the nineteenth century. That sounds deceivingly 
simple. What does or can ‘writing the global history of a century’ mean and how did 
Osterhammel actually try and do it? I will begin my review with some general comments 
on these methodological matters. Then I will comment on the role of connections and 
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comparisons in the book. Next I will indicate what I learned from reading it, focusing on 
topics on which I feel competent. The content of the book is so rich and so diverse that a 
full review of it would require far more expertise than I can claim. I will continue with a 
comment on what Osterhammel thinks his book could teach the reader. I conclude with 
my views on that ‘synthesis’ and a general evaluation. 
Some of my methodological comments may strike the reader as contradicting my very 
positive overall opinion on the book. They are not. I simply want to point at some major 
problems that every historian encounters when trying to write global history. As such, 
these problems are inherent to every form of history writing that wants to describe and 
interpret a part of the past. Point is that in global history they usually become more 
pressing and visible because of the scale on which global historians work. Osterhammel 
is aware of these problems, discusses them and deals with them. He does not solve them. 
That is not a fundamental critique. I think no one can. He comes up with a pragmatic 
solution in a beautiful book. The only thing I actually do in my comments is explicitly 
pointing at those problems and suggesting that a somewhat different, more problem-
oriented approach might have provided the book with a sharper ‘razor of Ockham’ and a 
clearer conclusion. Whether that would have resulted in a better book in the end I think 
is Geschmackssache.
*  *  *
My main methodological comments concern the way Osterhammel selects and defines 
his research object. What is the book actually about and how can such a topic be ‘coher-
ently’ described? A century is nothing but a slice of time filled with events. As such it 
does not present a historian with an obvious story to be told or an obvious problem to 
be solved. That implies that studying and presenting it to one’s readers may mean various 
things. One may want to figure out how it was ‘experienced’ at the time. The result will 
then be a ‘cultural’ history. Or one may, in contrast, look for its underlying structures 
that ‘elude’ the actors at the time and that can only be disclosed with the benefit of dis-
tance and hindsight. There is the possibility to study it ‘in its own terms’ and ‘for its own 
sake’ or, on the other hand, look at it in terms of what it means for the contemporary 
world. In that case one turns it into a prehistory of the present, as, for example, occurs in 
Wallerstein’s modern world-systems project.1 Osterhammel in his book apparently wants 
to try and go for the best of many worlds by combining various goals. He does not struc-
ture his material along chronological lines and is not bent on exclusively charting a flow 
of the main tendencies in nineteenth-century global development. Nor is it his intention 
– and even less his claim – to lay bare ‘the signature’ of that period, as in the end Bayly 
 Immanuel Wallerstein, The modern world system. Up until now three volumes have been published, one in 
974, one in 980, and one in 988.
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does in his book on the long nineteenth century.2 He definitely does not want to bypass 
how people in the nineteenth century themselves conceived of their age. But neither does 
he want to confine his story to that. He seems to be striving for a combination of ap-
proaches that would enable him, as he puts it, to give the nineteenth century its place in 
history (pp. 1279–1301). This would include how the century saw itself, how it lives on 
and how it can be looked upon from various contemporaneous angles. He resents taking 
it out of history or turning it into a mere prehistory. He agrees that a historian has to try 
and structure his period of study, but does not think his century has one definite charac-
ter or one main tendency. In that respect it need not come as a surprise that he thinks it 
is quite close to us in some, and far away and strange in other respects. 
Taking into consideration these (various) goals, the actual chronology used in the book 
can not simply coincide with the period from 1800 to 1900. Sensible periodisations 
in historiography are never based on purely formal indicators. They therefore are not 
‘inconsequential’ but debated and debatable. Osterhammel is well aware of that and 
devotes an entire chapter, the second one, to answering the question ‘When was the 
nineteenth century?’ Not surprisingly he comes up with an open and flexible answer. To 
be honest, I think the conclusion is inescapable that there is no chronology that makes 
real sense for the entire world of the nineteenth century. That world, apparently, knew 
no ‘global time’, nor a ‘global rhythm’. 
‘The world’, of which Osterhammel wants to write a history, as such is just a geographical 
expression. Here too, one may wonder what it means to write ‘its’ history. The author 
seems to realise there might be a problem here and devotes his third chapter to the ques-
tion: ‘Where is the nineteenth century? In it he deals with many interesting geographical 
issues, including mental maps. He does not, however, as might be expected, address 
the fundamental question whether and in what meaningful sense(s) one might say that 
in the nineteenth century the world had a history. Is there actually such a thing as ‘the 
world in the nineteenth century’ about which one might write a coherent, meaningful and 
global narrative? Answering that question entails an analysis of ‘globalisation’. Debates 
about the meaning of that term and about the history of the processes it is supposed to 
describe, are not always very interesting or enlightening. But in a project like this, the 
question to what extent the globe in the nineteenth century was globalised simply has 
to be addressed. The answer to it has wide ramifications for the type of book a global 
historian of the period could or even should in the end write and for the feasibility and 
significance of his project. It is ironic that Osterhammel, who is eminently suited to 
discus this question – and who actually says many very interesting things about it also in 
this book – does not tackle it in a separate, introductory chapter. Basically globalisation, 
or rather economic globalisation, is only discussed explicitly in Chapter XIV. The answer 
– I am quite confident – that he would come up with when asked whether there existed 
2 Chris Bayly, The birth of the modern world, 780–94, Malden 2004.
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‘one world’ in the nineteenth century, would be: No. So there was no ‘global space’ at 
the time either. 
This means that Osterhammel wants to write a global history of a period that has no 
(known) common time or rhythm, nor a common space. That of course does not exclude 
the possibility that someone as yet might ‘see’ them. Nor is it meant to deny that all sorts 
of ‘globalising’ were taking place. It only means that Osterhammel faces serious problems 
of demarcating and structuring his object. That would also have been the case, had he 
decided to write a history of Vorarlberg in the nineteenth century. But in a huge book 
about a huge topic, these problems may easily also become huge. All historical writing 
that aims at presenting a synthesis of whatever kind has to fix its ‘object’ in time and 
place. This is done not so much by describing an existing object as by constructing one in 
the actual act of writing about it. When Osterhammel tries to find out ‘when’ and ‘where’ 
his global nineteenth century was, he apparently, like every history writer, is looking for 
an object of study about which a significant and coherent story might be told.3 He realis-
es the necessity of having ‘a narrative substance’ for his story, but he thinks he has good 
reasons to not strictly confine his object of study in time and place and to not choose one 
single plot for overview. He does construct ‘narratives’ with various ‘plots’. But he does 
not want to push the search for coherence to its limit, i.e. to the level of a grand narrative 
or ‘meta-narrative’ as Patrick O’Brien would say: the story that encompasses all the other 
stories one has told or could tell about one’s subject.4 
This reticence is not a matter of a principled post-modern stance that opposes any grand 
narrative. It springs from the conviction that all-encompassing stories that cover the 
history of the globe in its entirety – whatever that may exactly mean – are ‘straitjackets’ 
that enforce a tight coherence on what actually is a fairly messy set of interacting and 
open processes. It is not by accident that Osterhammel does not come up with one single 
story encompassing the essence of the nineteenth century: he never set out to find one. 
He presents a history of a nineteenth century, not the history of the nineteenth century. 
Probably histories of the nineteenth century would have been an even more adequate 
title. The author does not want to pretend to be a neutral, omniscient story teller who 
fully ‘grasps’ his age.
This reticence to go for one over-arching theme is understandable and one can very 
well defend the thesis that if one wants to do ‘justice’ to the past, one simply has to be 
reticent in this respect. In my view, however, Osterhammel does have to pay a price for 
his laudable open-mindedness and his multi-faceted approach. They involve the risk that 
the reader starts wondering what the book is actually about, which will have a negative 
effect on his ability to absorb and digest the information that has been presented to him. 
Osterhammel’s stance is also somewhat surprising because actually he does have an out-
 For further explanation of the ‘narrative logic’ of the writing of a historical synthesis and of the concept ‘narrative 
substance’ that I use in this paragraph see F. R. Ankersmit, Narrative logic. A semantic analysis of the historian’s 
language, Groningen 98.
4 See e.g. his Meta-narratives in global histories of material progress, in: The International History Review 2, 2 
(200) 4-67. 
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spoken view on ‘the nature’ of his century and makes no secret of it. Already in the very 
beginning of the book, he claims that the nineteenth century was the century of Europe: 
never before were events all over the world determined to such an extent by what hap-
pened in one place and that place happened to be Europe or rather, the West. Whether 
one hated the Westerners or loved them, and whether one wanted to imitate them or 
rejected their way of living: with their industry, military power, science and technology, 
Westerners were changing the world beyond recognition and simply could not be ignored 
(pp. 20-21). Osterhammel is too good a historian to be impressed by weirdly Sinocentric 
and fashionably anti-Eurocentric books like those that have recently been published by 
authors like Frank or Hobson. When he refers to them, he, as a rule rather tongue-in-
cheek and nuanced, can hardly conceal his annoyance (p. 1391, note 47). 
Why then does the author not present his book as a thesis on modernization or on ‘the 
rise of the West’? He is quite clear about that: he thinks that these concepts have both 
been object of severe and often justified critique. Classic stories about the rise of the 
West, in particular, are now often considered to be teleological and determinist and wed-
ded to the idea of ‘European exceptionalism’.5 Osterhammel also, and explicitly, rejects 
the idea of turning the Great Divergence, as it is defined by Kenneth Pomeranz, into the 
overarching theme of his book.6 According to him, that too would imply that one, from 
the very beginning of one’s writing and research, tackles the historical material with an 
exclusive focus on European exceptionalism. In my final comments, I will come back to 
these claims and indicate that in my view Osterhammel exaggerates the dangers of using 
such grand narratives, in particular in case of the Great Divergence. 
In the end it all boils down to the fact that Osterhammel wants to sail firmly between the 
Scylla of over-systematization that distorts history and the Charybdis of postmodernism 
that dissolves it. He does look for what one might call ‘narratives of the middle range’, 
hoping to come up with statements that have explanatory value. But while doing so, he 
constantly changes perspective, and looks in all corners of the world for similarities and 
differences, to in that way also keep things ‘open’. It is this dialectic that more than any-
thing else makes the book such a brilliant example of global history. He presents various 
separate stories, not one. He does assess them in a final chapter without, however, want-
ing to provide a conclusion or a closure. His final comments are not but, as Osterham-
mel puts it, an overview from the heights of generalization after which one should again 
descend into new detailed research (p. 1278).
*  *  *
 This critique is not only, understandably, often addressed at the best-seller by David S. Landes, The wealth and 
poverty of nations. Why some are so rich and some so poor, London 998, but also, less understandably, at the 
works of Immanuel Wallerstein.
6 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy, Prin-
ceton 2000.
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Global history usually comes in two flavours; one that primarily focuses on connecting 
and one that is more interested in comparing. Osterhammel practises both, although I 
would say the forte of his work lays in his comparisons. When it comes to connections, 
he provides many fine anecdotes that show that the world in various respects was getting 
smaller during his century. What to think of the Ethiopian emperor Menelik II, who in 
the early 1890s bought 100,000 French Lebel guns with two million rounds of ammuni-
tion, built up his own weapons production with the help of a Swiss adviser and in March 
1896 defeated an Italian Amy? (p. 697); or of the fact that in the Ottoman Empire and 
in Iran, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Belgian constitution of 1831 had 
a good reputation? (p. 805) Western imperialism could be at the basis of quite peculiar 
exchanges of information. After 1882, the British saw to it that Egypt got a police force 
organised after the model of that of India (p. 888). 
This shrinking of the globe would have been impossible without revolutionary changes 
in communication and transport. Again Osterhammel gives very illuminating examples. 
In 1798, the message of Bonaparte’s invasion in Egypt took sixty-two days to reach Lon-
don. On 8 January 1815, 1000 British and American soldiers were killed in the battle of 
New Orleans. That could have been avoided, had the news reached their commanders 
that already on December 24, peace had been concluded between their countries (p. 
1026). Just before there was a telegraph connection between London and Australia, in 
1871, a message from London, which then still meant a letter, took sixty days to arrive 
in Sidney. At the end of the 1880s, news from whatever place on earth reached London 
in some two days. Transport became much faster and cheaper too: in 1906, costs of 
transport per unit of weight between Great Britain and India were only two per cent of 
what they had been in 1793 (p. 1035). 
This of course had its implications for long-distance trade. The nineteenth century wit-
nessed an enormous increase of it. Between 1850 and 1913 alone, the value of interna-
tional trade in constant prices increased tenfold (p. 1033). Foreign investment basically 
was a nineteenth-century European invention. In the period 1820–1913, Europeans 
invested some nine to ten billion pound sterling overseas (p. 1047). Mobility of people 
also increased. Between 1815 and 1914, according to Osterhammel, at least eighty-two 
million people voluntarily migrated to another country (p. 235). As a matter of fact, that 
seems a fairly low estimate to me. 
Quite interesting with respect to the question in how far the nineteenth-century world 
was indeed ‘one world’, is the fact that in the period 1876–1880, about three-quarters 
of international trade was on account of Europe, including Russia, and North America. 
In 1914, that proportion had hardly changed (p. 1033). When we look at international 
migration or capital flows, basically the same conclusion has to be drawn: only very spe-
cific parts of the world were really well-connected. In that context it is fascinating to see 
that Japan, the only non-Western country at the time that at least began ‘to make’ it, kept 
both foreign investments and foreign debt to an absolute minimum (pp. 1050-1051). 
If one wants to describe the nineteenth- century world as a web, then it was a web with 
huge holes. Just like the current world, I may add, that, for example, when it comes to 
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foreign domestic investments in regions like Africa and Latin America, has become less 
interconnected than it was a century ago (p. 1052). All this information is taken from 
Osterhammel’s book. The implications it my have for his project are not really spelled 
out. In that respect one would like to know why the book is called Die Verwandlung der 
Welt? Is it because Osterhammel regards the nineteenth century as the global century par 
excellence in the history of the world as he implies on page 14? Does this title also have 
Kafkaesque connotations? 
Global interconnectedness did increase. But that of course does not mean that all major 
events on the globe at the time can only be understood in a global setting. The revolu-
tionary upheavals in Europe in the late 1840s, for example, had no impact whatsoever in 
the rest of the world, nor was there anything ‘extra-European’ in their origins. In 1888, 
the French philosopher and cultural historian Louis Bourdeau could still comment that 
for 400 million Chinese there had been no French Revolution (p. 96). The Taiping Re-
bellion (1850–1864) in China, the major upheaval in terms of casualties in the world 
during the nineteenth century, was completely unrelated to what had been going on in 
Europe only a couple of years before. But on the other hand; its leader claimed he was 
inspired by Christian texts and the rebellion was in the end suppressed by China’s rulers 
with help from the West. 
*  *  *
What is most interesting and challenging in the book, from a scholarly perspective, are 
the numerous comparisons it contains. The reader will not come across extensive, ‘me-
thodical’ analyses with a large methodological apparatus. Osterhammel himself describes 
his style of comparing as a prudent, controlled game of association and analogy (p. 16). 
His book contains so many examples that it would make no sense to even try and enu-
merate them. Let me just refer to a couple of them, almost all fascinating eye-openers. 
The author, for example, compares instances of hunger in Ireland, the Russian Empire, 
Africa and Asia (pp. 300-314); department stores and restaurants all over the globe (pp. 
341-345); frontiers in the Americas (the United States, Argentina and Brazil), in Eurasia 
(Russia and China) and South Africa (chapter seven); the specific ways in which national 
states were created in Japan and in the United States (pp. 596-601); various revolutions 
in the Atlantic region (pp. 747-769); the upheavals in Europe in 1848–1849 and the 
Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) in China, what in the West used to be called ‘the Great 
Mutiny’ in India but is now better known as the Indian Rebellion of 1857, and finally, 
the American Civil War of 1861–1865 (pp. 777-798); revolutionary movements in the 
beginning of the twentieth century in Russia, Iran, Turkey and China (pages 800-816); 
the reforming monarchies of Queen Victoria, the Meiji Emperor and Louis Napoleon 
(pp. 838-846); the development of bureaucracy in India, China, the Ottoman Empire 
and Japan, (pp. 870-882); routes of economic non-development in Latin America, Chi-
na and India, contrasting them with what happened in Japan (pp. 938-950); the his-
2 | Peer Vries
tory of aristocrats in France, Russia, Britain, India, Japan and that of the mandarins in 
China (pp. 1066-1079); the way the European university was adopted and adapted in 
the rest of the world (pp. 1132- 1147); abolitionism in various parts of the world and 
post-emancipation society in South Africa, the United States and Brazil (pp. 1188-1214) 
Western and non-Western racism (pp. 1214-1228). 
*  *  *
I am not going to try and give an overview or summary of the content of the book. That 
simply is not feasible. I can only advise everyone interested in global history to read it 
and enjoy its enormous width and depth. I actually read the book from the first to the 
last page: can one say more in praise of such an enormous book? A review of a book that 
is so rich in data, interpretations and comparisons and that leaves hardly any topic one 
might think of untouched, cannot, however, confine itself entirely to general ‘method-
ological’ matters. Some comments on the actual content are in order. When reading the 
book, what patterns, what narratives of the medium range does one see? What can one 
learn from its content and methods? I will confine my comments to economic develop-
ments and matters related to the state in the widest sense of the word. These are topics 
on which I hope I have developed a certain expertise. Just like Weber and Osterhammel, 
who in that respect follows in Weber’s footsteps, I will in particular refer to examples that 
show how our views on Europe’s history during the nineteenth century might change 
when we adopt a more global perspective (see e.g. p. 1284).  
A first observation one can make on the basis of information provided by Osterhammel, 
would be that the ‘Old Regime’ persisted much more stubbornly than grand narratives 
on modernization liked to suggest. The ‘classic’ image of the nineteenth-century, espe-
cially in the social sciences, is that of the age of modernization, the era in which, to put 
it in sociological terms, traditional Gemeinschaft made way for modern Gesellschaft.7 In 
economic history textbooks the emphasis is then laid on industrialisation. Of course, the 
nineteenth century is the age of the first industrial revolution. But Osterhammel rightly 
points at the fact that at its very end there still were only a handful of nations that in any 
meaningful sense could be called ‘industrial’. They, moreover, were all in the West: out-
side that part of the world, there was only one nation – namely Japan – that had begun 
to industrialise. The modern factory still was a rarity.
As a matter of fact, world-wide the number of peasants may well have increased. Agri-
cultural production in any case did, as did the amount of land under cultivation. Ag-
riculture continued to be by far the biggest sector of the global economy. Nor should 
7 The literature about modernity, what it might mean and what is wrong with simple, unilinear universal theories 
of modernization, is staggering, and this of course is not the place to address it. I simply assume that it, in its 
main propositions, is known to the reader. For a very knowledgeable and up-to-date overview and analysis, that 
is historically surprisingly well-informed, see Wolfgang Knöbl, Die Kontingenz der Moderne. Wege in Europa, 
Asien und Amerika, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2007.
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one underestimate the importance of services. Let me just give one striking example of 
what may be called a ‘traditional service’: In 1911, there were no less than 2.5 million 
domestic servants in Britain. They were the largest occupational group in the country’s 
census, twice as large as that of people working in quarries and mines (p. 991). The im-
portance of so-called ‘modern services’ like banking, finance, insurance or transport, that 
actually might already be quite old, could also be substantial in advanced economies, if 
not in terms of people working then in any case in the amounts of money involved. In 
the most advanced economy of the world, Britain, where these sectors had already been 
quite important in the eighteenth century, they, after a brief industrial interlude, quite 
soon again became the leading sectors of the national economy. It did not take long be-
fore London with its harbour and its ‘City’ would again be more important for Britain’s 
economy than ‘Lancashire’. 
However that may be, industrialization – or more in general, modern economic growth 
and development – did not come about spontaneously. Authors as diverse as Marx, We-
ber or Sombart, basically agreed about its main cause: they all, as Weber put it, regarded 
capitalism as the “most fateful force of our modern life.”8 These scholars have had a long-
lasting, big influence and they, of course, had a point. But Osterhammel’s global over-
view shows that their interpretation of capitalism as a mode of production characterised 
by free labour, historically speaking, is too superficial. Even in Britain’s factories, free la-
bour, in the modern meaning of the word, only became normal in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. There definitely was no world-wide, smooth transition from un-free 
to free labour, if only because distinctions in practice were rather blurred. From a global 
perspective, emancipation of labour during the nineteenth century was a protracted and 
unfinished process. It could hardly have been otherwise: the role and importance of un-
free labour at its beginning was simply staggering. It was still quite substantial at its end. 
As an economic historian I found Osterhammel’s analysis of capitalism and labour in 
chapters XII and XIII very informative, clear and knowledgeable.
A third concept that usually pops up in studies of the (economic) history of the nine-
teenth century is ‘imperialism’. It often is directly related to the phenomena I just re-
ferred to: industry and capitalism. The connection that is then suggested between them is 
normally quite straightforward: industry and capitalism made imperialism possible and 
after some time they could not persist without it. Osterhammel shows that in fact things 
were not that straightforward at all and that the suggested ‘succession’ is quite debatable 
(pp. 621-622).9 Let me give one telling and important example: the British were already 
building their empire in India before their country was ‘industrialised’. On the other 
hand, during the process of its industrialisation, their country was less dependent on its 
8 This famous quote is taken from Max Weber, Vorbemerkung, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie. 
There are many editions. I here quote from Max Weber, Religion und Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur 
Religionssoziologie, Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. .
9 See for interesting observations in this respect, John Darwin, After Tamerlane The global history of empire, 
London 2007, e.g. chapters four and six. I wrote a review of this book in: British Scholar, vol. , issue  (2008) -
7.
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empire than during its pre-industrial eighteenth century, when it still had its thirteen 
colonies in Northern America, or during the first half of the twentieth century, when it 
was becoming ‘post-industrial’. 
In all the textbooks on European history I know, the nineteenth century is depicted as 
the century in which nation-building – something supposedly typical for Europe – was 
a if not the major driving force in history. Nation-building implies some form of nation-
alism, which can be defined as the political ideology that claims that the state and the 
nation, both to a large extent also regarded as products of Europe’s nineteenth century, 
should coincide. Here too, Osterhammel presents a more nuanced story. To begin with, 
he thinks it is exaggerated to regard nationalism, the state and the nation as typically or 
even exclusively European. He is right. To then draw the conclusion that European states 
and nations therefore were nothing special, however, would be erring in the opposite 
direction. Not that Osterhammel explicitly says so, but I must say he is rather quiet on 
European peculiarities in this respect. 
More important, and certainly to the point, is his second comment that, globally speak-
ing, empires were much more characteristic of the era, until its very end, than nation 
states. The Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Empires only perished in and because of the 
First World War, with the Russian Empire basically being succeeded by a Soviet Empire. 
The German Empire, that may not actually fit Osterhammel’s definition of an empire, 
also only disappeared in 1918. For Asia and Africa the nineteenth century was even less 
a century of national states than it was for Europe. Around 1900, Asia was still firmly in 
control of empires. 
The related idea that the nineteenth century was a century of intense state-formation 
can and should also be nuanced. The most important new state on the world stage, the 
United States of America, in many respects was anything but a Weberian state, and did 
not aspire to be one, as Osterhammel shows in chapter 11. In most European states, 
expenditure by government as a percentage of GDP, in real terms at least, tended to de-
crease over the century instead of increase, a fact to which Osterhammel does not refer.10 
Colonial state-building, moreover, had a logic that was quite different from that prevail-
ing in the Western colonising states themselves. Osterhammel’s book provides succinct 
descriptions when it e.g. discusses the situation in India or Algeria (see for Algeria pp. 
629-631, the situation in India is discussed at various places). 
Talking about state- and nation-building in the context of nineteenth-century Europe as 
a rule implied references to emancipation, extension of the right to vote and the coming 
of democracy. Again Osterhammel prefers a more prudent stance. On a global scale it 
is anything but clear that in 1900 more people were living in circumstances that might 
be regarded as ‘democratic’, than in 1800. References to ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’ as 
ultimate sources of power and legitimacy did become increasingly fashionable. But that 
need not mean much for actual power relations. As always, appearances can be deceptive. 
0 See Michael Mann, The sources of social power. Vol. II, The rise of classes and nation states, 760–94, Cam-
bridge 99, chapter : The rise of the modern state. 
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In no part of the world were so many constitutions declared as in Latin America: eleven 
between 1826 and 1880 in Bolivia and ten in Peru between 1821 and 1867 (p. 856). In 
many regions of the world, moreover, government rule continued to be unabashedly un-
democratic. That definitely also goes for Eastern and Central Europe, where, for example 
Joseph II, let alone Nicolas II, can hardly be accused of posing as fanatic democrats. In 
Western Europe politicians like Bismarck and even more Louis Napoleon realised the 
growing importance of public opinion but regarded it as something to use rather than 
something to obey. If one regards the extension of the right to vote to all adults and the 
principle – and its institutional safeguard! – that the people are sovereign as fundamental 
to democratic rule, then one must conclude that in 1914 democracy still was extremely 
rare. Most countries on the globe still were highly un-democratic. 
In the eyes of many modernizers in the nineteenth century, to become modern at least 
initially had meant to get rid of crowned heads and aristocrats. As a matter of fact, not 
many new republics were created. Monarchy proved to be quite resilient. In countries 
like Britain and Japan – and in France under Louis Napoleon – it was renewed and even 
gained in importance. In Europe the role of the aristocracy as an estate may indeed have 
declined, but for many aristocrats individually the nineteenth century was a kind of In-
dian summer (p. 1071). Again, a look at the situation outside Europe, in this case at the 
decline of the Chinese mandarins – of course not a real i.e. hereditary aristocracy – and 
at the transformation of the Japanese samurai, two groups Osterhammel also compares 
to each other, proves to be very enlightening and interesting (pp. 1073-1079).
A second ‘lesson’ one may draw from the book is that ‘the modern’ and ‘the traditional’ 
were not simple opposites, but could interact in such a way that ‘the new’ not so much 
destroyed ‘the old’ but in a way gave it a boost. This may go as far as enforcing or even 
actually ‘inventing’ it. I could give elementary examples of this in the field of economic 
history, e.g. the fact that in the beginning of industrialisation the consumption of wood 
and water as power sources increased instead of decreased as on might have expected. 
The same, by the way, goes for the use of horses in production. More interesting is the 
broader phenomenon that traditional sectors or modes of production could receive a 
boost through the increase in production in those sectors of the economy that had been 
‘industrialised’. The most famous example here undoubtedly is the increase of handloom 
weaving of cotton after cotton spinning had become mechanized. Household producers 
often reacted to competition by factories by working harder and longer and trying to 
hold their own through their flexibility and their cheap labour. In that way industrialisa-
tion might set in motion processes of ‘involution’. Big factories, moreover, might be sup-
plied by small-scale ‘traditional’ production-units like households, sweatshops and the 
like. As a rule they delivered semi-finished products to them. In current interpretations, 
the revolutionary image of the first industrial revolution, epitomised by steam-engines 
and factories, has been toned down quite substantially. A growing awareness has devel-
oped of continuities and of the existence – even in industrialised societies – of forms of 
flexible and dispersed production and of labour-intensive industrialisation. On a global 
scale, the rise of a modern proletariat in a couple of pockets of industrial production 
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hardly changed the overall composition of the labour force in terms of free versus un-
free labour. Slavery only officially disappeared in the Western hemisphere in the second 
half of the nineteenth. In parts of Africa and Asia it persisted even then. The number of 
indentured labourers increased in that half century and was not unrelated to growth in 
certain modern economic sectors. The main change in this respect actually was the eman-
cipation of the peasants as it occurred in many countries over the century. 
In the field of politics one can quite easily give examples of a reinforcing or even (re-)in-
venting of tradition. State and nation in their nineteenth-century appearances undoubt-
edly were new, ‘modern’ phenomena. They as a rule, however, were provided with all 
sorts of invented traditions to make them look ‘ancient’ and ‘respectable’ and thereby 
legitimise them. A similar mechanism can be seen at work in Western colonies, where 
the new foreign rulers tended to create a neatly-arranged ‘traditional’ society that was 
easier for them to rule and that ‘primitivised’ their colonies and their inhabitants with 
the added advantage of providing the colonisers with good reasons to embark on a ci-
vilising mission. Again Osterhammel has a telling anecdote: in 1947 there were 3.5 mil-
lion people in India who had been classified by their colonisers as hereditary (sic! P. V.) 
criminal members of certain tribes or caste’s. The caste-system in many respects owed 
more to Britain’s rule than to India’s history (p. 891). In that context one often sees a 
propping-up of ‘ancient’ rulers to ensure that behind traditional appearances the new 
foreign rulers might try and rule via middlemen. It, more in general, is striking how the 
nineteenth century was fascinated by ‘the modern’ and by ‘the past’. It definitely was the 
most historically-conscious century in world history and the era when history as a disci-
pline was born. Osterhammel tells us that in 1921 the state-owned Historical Museum 
in Peking wanted to sell 60.000 kilo’s of archival records to a dealer in waste paper (p. 
33). A bibliophile scholar saved these texts by buying them. This sort of behaviour would 
have met with much more public uproar in Western Europe.
A third conclusion one can draw from reading Osterhammel’s book to me would be that 
there was more than one road leading towards ‘modernity’. Amongst economic histori-
ans that of course became general knowledge already quite some time ago. Gerschenkron 
already in the 1960s thought about the implications of the fact that backward economies 
had to catch-up with economies that were quickly moving forward and pointed at the 
fact that ‘the big spurt’ they had to make, implied a larger role for e.g. the state, banks 
and capital goods industries than in countries that had industrialized earlier on.11 Later 
studies could only corroborate his ideas and conclude that there is no general model or 
theory that fits all cases of nineteenth-century industrialisation.12 Osterhammel refers to 
them and agrees. Ever since the seminal publication of Barrington Moore Jr. we basi-
 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness in historical perspective, Cambridge 962.
2 See e.g. Rondo Cameron, ‘A new view of European industrialization’, The Economic History Review 8 (98) 
-2; Patrick O’Brien, Do we have a typology for the study of European industrialization in the XIXth century?, 
in: Journal of European Economic History  (986) 29-, and Mikuláŝ Teich / Roy Porter (eds.), The industrial 
revolution in national context, Cambridge 996.
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cally know this also applies to modernisation and industrialisation in general and on a 
world-wide scale.13 
Basically the same applies to the process of state-formation. Charles Tilly some twenty 
years ago, pointed at the existence of different trajectories of state-formation in Europe 
before the nineteenth century. For that century he postulated a certain convergence as 
the national territorial state became the rule.14 As such that is correct. But under the 
cloak of ‘the national territorial state’, there, even in Europe, over the entire long nine-
teenth century continued to exist quite different state-structures with quite different tra-
jectories. One only needs to compare, for example, Britain, Germany and the Habsburg 
Empire to see that. Differences outside Europe could even be bigger. Here as in so many 
respects, the comparison of Japan and China proves to be very instructive. 
If there have been various roads to ‘modernity’, it almost by necessity can not always 
have had identical ingredients. That is another lesson one can learn from Osterhammel’s 
work: modernity is not a package deal, in the sense that a society either has all its sup-
posed characteristics – assuming that scholars would agree on what exactly these would 
be – or none.15 As such, this can hardly be denied. Whether Eisenstadt’s program of 
looking for ‘multiple modernities’ to which Osterhammel refers, is really as promising in 
this predicament as he thinks, I personally doubt (p. 1281). Here again, I hope a couple 
of examples will suffice. Britain became the first industrial nation in the world. Thanks 
to its fiscal-military state that was underpinned by a highly efficient fiscal bureaucracy, it 
had also become the most powerful state in the world. There are good reasons to claim 
it also was the first modern nation. But on the other hand, with the passing of time its 
not-so-modern or not-modernising sides also began to show clearly: in the nineteenth 
century it had no constitution, used a system of ‘common law’ and had no conscrip-
tion. When it comes to the extension of the vote and the creation of a state that also 
undertakes many activities in the civil sphere, it was quickly surpassed by various other 
countries in Europe. In terms of its formal democratization and the structure of its state, 
post-Napoleonic France would be an excellent candidate for the title ‘most modern state 
of the world’; its agriculture with its large number of peasants, however, does not strike 
most observers as very modern. Germany at the end of the nineteenth century had 
become an industrial and military world power. In standard modernization theory that 
is hard to square with the continued power of its Junkers. One would be really hard-
pressed to find a city where ‘modernism’ had more impact in arts, sciences and culture 
than ‘fin-de-siècle Vienna’, the capital of an empire that was not exactly known for its 
modernity. One can easily find examples of this ‘simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’ 
outside Europe too. Meiji Japan quickly became an industrial and military nation to be 
reckoned with. It borrowed all kinds of modern institutions from the rest of world: in 
 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Lord and peasant in the making of the mo-
dern world, Boston 966.
4 Charles Tilly, Coercion, capital and European states, 990–990, Oxford / Cambridge 990. 
 This of course implies that the concept of ‘early modernity’ that is so often used in global history basically is also 
highly problematic.
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these respects it certainly modernized. In other respects, for example when it comes to 
democratisation and the position of its godlike Emperor, not much ‘progress’ was made. 
In the Chinese case it is striking that in the eighteenth century the country had an econ-
omy that in many respects was more ‘Smithian’ and capitalist than that of most parts of 
Europe at the time. Comparatively speaking, competition on its markets was quite free 
and fair. Its administration, moreover, in various respects was more bureaucratic than 
that in most Western countries. This, as we all know, did not entail an across-the-board 
modernization in the nineteenth century.
*  *  *
This is what I distilled or one may say ‘abstracted’ from the text, although I think the real 
value of this book does not so much consist in any abstract conclusions it may yield as 
in its concrete stories and analyses. But then, what characterises the nineteenth century 
according to Osterhammel? Notwithstanding his reticence to draw firm, hard conclusions, 
he obviously can not simple let his huge book ‘peter out’ without any general reflections. 
He therefore synthesizes his findings in five main points. 
The first one is the emergence of asymmetric increases in efficiency and effectiveness. 
Human productivity during the period increased enormously. The era discussed in the 
book witnessed the birth of modern economic growth, defined as a sustained or even 
self-sustaining and substantial increase in wealth per capita. In advanced economies it 
even became to be regarded as normal. This ‘new economy’ was based on an increasing 
and more efficient use of energy, to which Osterhammel devotes an entire chapter, and 
on permanent technological innovation. The increase in production that characterised it 
was also due to the fact that all over the globe frontiers were opened and new land put to 
use. Huge increases in efficiency and effectiveness also occurred in military affairs, which 
basically means, that the military became a much more efficient killing machine, wield-
ing much more lethal power. Finally he points at big increases in the effectiveness with 
which governments could rule over society. 
The meaning of the adjective ‘asymmetric’ is obvious: apart from Japan, that at the eve 
of World War I was still quite poor as compared to the richest Western countries, fun-
damental ‘progress’ in the respects Osterhammel refers to, was basically confined to the 
West. The growing gap between rich and poor shows clearly in table 6 on page 255 of the 
book. The world, as never before, became divided in a couple of rich and a lot of poor 
countries, but also – and again on an unprecedented scale – between a couple of ruling 
countries and a lot of countries that were ruled by them. Both these facts of course were 
not unconnected to the huge differences that had emerged in government efficiency. 
Again, this ‘progress’ was not a package deal: one could be frontrunner in one sector and 
rather backward in another one. 
The divergence that emerged was really great. Let me just give a couple of examples, 
taken from the book, to show how wealthy some were becoming as compared to many 
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others. The examples refer to Britain. In 1850, this country produced sixty-five per cent 
of all coal in the world. In 1914 that was still twenty per cent (p. 934). In that year, of 
total tonnage of all fleets in the world, forty-five per cent belonged to Britain and its 
colonies (p. 1016). Again in 1914, fifty per cent of all foreign investment on the globe 
was British (p. 1048). British income per capita in 1914, was about nine times as high 
as that of China, whereas according to most economic historians that ratio would have 
been two to one around 1800, very probably even less. When it comes to Western power, 
I think one figure can suffice: According to Geoffrey Parker by 1914, Westerners, i.e., 
Western states or descendants from colonisers from these states, ruled over almost eighty-
five per cent of the world’s land surface.16 
A second characteristic of the nineteenth century according to Osterhammel would be 
the enormous increase in mobility. The figures for international and especially long- 
distance, intercontinental migration are staggering and dwarf those of earlier periods. 
I already referred to the eighty-two million people who are supposed to have migrated 
abroad in the period from 1814 to 1914. Most of them crossed the Atlantic Ocean. But 
it has become increasingly clear that migration also grew enormously in other parts of 
the world. Productivity and total production may have increased. But that applies even 
more to international trade. We already indicated it grew no less than tenfold. Enormous 
increase also characterised another type of mobility that we have already pointed at: for-
eign capital investment. Huge flows of capital moved around the world, or rather from 
specific core regions to specific peripheries. That the new means of transportation and 
communication made people more mobile and life more speedy is clear. 
Then there was, and that is Osterhammel’s third characteristic: what he calls ‘an asym-
metric tightening of referencing’. The word ‘tightening’ refers to an increase of intercul-
tural observations and transfers. It is described as ‘asymmetric’ because more than ever 
before certain societies, in this case certain Western societies, became point of reference 
if not model and example for many other societies. Their wealth, power and dynamism 
were such that even non-Westerners who did not like the Western way of living – and 
there were many of them, see e.g. the striking lack of success of the West in exporting 
what is often seen as its main cultural characteristic, to wit Christianity – had to face 
the challenge the West posed. It will not have been by accident that in matters that re-
ally mattered, cultural exchange was a one-way street: from ‘the West’ to ‘the Rest’ (p. 
1295).
A fourth characteristic of the age according to Osterhammel, would have been the emer-
gence of a worldwide, increasing tension between equality and hierarchy. Inequality 
tended to become something ‘unnatural’, i.e. something that was no longer obvious and 
needed defending. There emerged a clear willingness to lessen or abolish it in terms of 
formal law and to come to a general equality. Westerners liked to use this ideal as a yard-
stick for showing how ‘uncivilised’ other societies were and to legitimise intervention in 
6 Geoffrey Parker, ‘Introduction: the Western way of war’ in: idem (ed.), Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, 
Cambridge 99, p. 9.
3 | Peer Vries
their affairs. Those on a civilising mission may have been patronising and arrogant but 
they at least thought ‘other’ people could be civilised in the end, which in practice often 
meant in an ever receding future. There also, however, emerged a current in Western 
thinking – one should be wary though of claiming that this occurred only there – that 
other people could never be civilised as they belonged to a different race. The nineteenth 
century is also, as Osterhammel points out, the century of the spread of ‘scientific’ rac-
ism which explicitly denies that all people are equal and should be treated accordingly. 
But this too, and that is Osterhammel’s point, set the topic of equality versus inequality 
firmly on the agenda. 
That brings us to the last characteristic of the age as seen by Osterhammel. He thinks the 
nineteenth century can also be described as the century of emancipation. Not in sense 
that everyone was emancipated of course. But it increasingly was understood that this 
in principle had to be the case. The ideal was set on the agenda and would not go away. 
Opinions were of course divided on how exactly and fast this ideal should be imple-
mented. What is more, especially in colonial situations, the West became increasingly 
less serious about the glaring gap that existed between its high principles and its actual 
behaviour. This fundamentally undermined its credibility and caused Gandhi’s famous 
comment that Western civilization would be a good idea. 
*  *  *
If the above is indeed a correct description of the main facts of the history of the globe 
in the nineteenth century, which I think it is, then the main challenge of any analysis of 
that history can only be to find the explanation of these facts. That, I think, boils down 
to finding the causes of the Great Divergence. For the first three ‘facts’ this is so obvious 
that there is no need to expand on that. For the other two facts, or rather tensions, it is 
also quite clear that without ‘the rise of the West’ to its dominance, they would at least 
have been much less acute. 
Osterhammel’s description and interpretation of that divergence is quite good and nu-
anced. The reader willing to do that would probably be able to compile a satisfactory ex-
planation from various parts of the text. I think, however, the book would have definitely 
won if in the comments at the end, the author would have briefly synthesised what he 
thinks about nature and causes of the Great Divergence, the main event of his century. 
Such a synthesis would have been very welcome: It would have helped people very much 
in assessing what they may have actually learned. Considering the enormous amount of 
topics discussed in the book and the enormous amount of pages devoted to them that 
may not be superfluous. I am sure that, let us say, twenty pages could have easily been 
skipped someplace else and devoted to that theme.
Asking what caused the Great Divergence in economic terms actually is asking four 
different questions. Firstly, why did any country at all manage to escape from the Mal-
thusian constraints of the economic ancien regime? Basically that boils down to asking 
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for the causes of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. This is a topic that is com-
petently and amply discussed by Osterhammel. Secondly, it means asking why the new 
type of growth that emerged with this revolution did not stop as had always been the 
case before, but continued. In his discussions of science and technology Osterhammel 
provides his reader with sufficient material to construct an answer to this question too. 
Thirdly, explaining the Great Divergence means explaining why various countries in the 
world – in the nineteenth century all of them Western except Japan – were able to catch 
up with Britain. The Great Divergence up until far into the twentieth century remained 
a matter of ‘the West plus Japan versus the Rest’ not of ‘Britain versus the Rest’. Here I 
think the author could have done more: What is it that made catching up for most coun-
tries in Western Europe, like Germany and France, so relatively easy? Then finally, there 
of course is the problem of why so many countries did not catch up. This topic again is 
quite extensively dealt with by Osterhammel. 
Western economic hegemony was combined with military and political hegemony. These 
enabled the West to set equality and emancipation on the global agenda and provided 
people elsewhere with the challenge to respond. Military and political hegemony meant 
military and political strength. Anyone readying about the history of the world in the 
nineteenth century sooner or later will have to deal with the surprising fact that tiny 
Britain turn could a huge country like India into a colony and force the government of 
the enormous Chinese empire to allow opium imports into its realm. As indicated, this 
strength was not simply a derivative of Western economic strength. Next to matters of 
finance and technology, that did of course play a role, organisation, discipline, cohesion, 
and motivation, also were important. In this respect too, it would have been helpful if 
Osterhammel had done some synthesising at the end of his book in effort to show us 
what specifically was behind Western dominance in these respects.    
*  *  *
There are good reasons to be wary of studying nineteenth-century global history with 
one leading question in the back of one’s mind. But I think Osterhammel tends to 
exaggerate the dangers of a more problem-oriented approach, and to underestimate its 
advantages. If one basically is convinced that the nineteenth century was the age of the 
Great Divergence, as I think Osterhammel is, using that topic to structure one’s ‘grand 
narrative’, need not imply a biased approach. Nor need it imply an exclusive focus on 
Western exceptionalism, i.e., on what is different in Europe and on the advantages of 
those differences (p. 21). The literature dealing with developments in the nineteenth 
century in terms of the Great Divergence as it is defined by Kenneth Pomeranz, explicitly 
rejects teleological or determinist thinking, and explicitly rejects European exceptional-
ism. Using the Great Divergence-narrative, on the other hand might have provided Os-
terhammel’s text with a clearer theme and more coherence. That is not something to be 
scorned in case of a text as voluminous as his. But as I indicated before, I am not claiming 
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that this by necessity would have turned it into a better text. Osterhammel chooses for 
assessment, openness, breadth, playfully comparing and connecting, I personally tend to 
go for problem-solving, closure, focus and methodological seriousness. But that means 
we apparently prefer different styles. I see no objective grounds for calling one style bet-
ter than the other or to even go as far to prescribe one at the exclusion of the other. The 
house of history indeed has and should have many mansions. 
*  *  *
In his Afterword, Osterhammel writes he thought the time had come for him to no 
longer discuss the writing of global history but to actually practise it. In his terms, it is 
time to no longer bother about cooking books and start cooking. That may sound as an 
amateur cook giving it a first try. Actually we are dealing here with a world-class master 
chef, who has prepared a delicious, quite huge and affordable meal. Vaut le détour, as the 
Guide Michelin would say. 
